Previous empirical literature suggests that estimated wage cyclicality depends on the structure of the relationship between real wages and an observed indicator of the business cycle that econometric models impose prior to estimation. This paper, alleviates the problem of imposing such structure by searching directly for the largest common cycles in longitudinal microdata using a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model. We find that the comovement of real wages is related to a common factor that exhibits a significant but imperfect correlation with the national unemployment rate. Among others, our findings indicate that the common factor explains, on average, no more than 9% of wage variation, it accounts for 20% or less of the wage variability for 88% of the workers in the sample and roughly half of the wages move procyclically while half move countercyclically. These facts are inconsistent with claims of a strong systematic relationship between real wages and business cycles.
Introduction
The cyclicality of real wages is a crucial element that allows us to differentiate between competing theories of the labor market. Previous econometric studies impose structure on the relationship between real wages and an observed indicator of the business cycle (the unemployment rate) prior to estimation. In fact, the findings from the literature suggest that the estimated wage cyclicality depends on this structure: real wages are estimated to be mildly to strongly procyclical when wages are assumed to depend only on the current unemployment rate [e.g., Bils (1985) , Keane, Moffitt, and Runkle (1988) , Shin (1994) , Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) , and Shin and Solon (2006) and, more recently, Verdugo (2016) ] whereas they are estimated to be acyclical when the real wage of each individual, in addition to the current unemployment rate (common across all wages), is assumed to also depend on 'appropriate' lagged values of the unemployment rate [e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) ]. 1 In this paper, we estimate wage comovement, which then allows us to draw conclusions about real wage cyclicality, avoiding the problem of imposing any a priori structure on the relationship between real wages and observed indicators of the business cycle. In particular, we provide new evidence using longitudinal microdata in conjunction with a relatively recent econometric approach, that of a dynamic factor model. 2 The dynamic factor model searches directly for the largest common cycle in wage data, alleviating the problem of defining the cycle as any particular macroeconomic variable. The use of individual micro data allows us to determine whether the cyclicality of wages is specific to a certain subset of individuals, which alleviates the problem of composition bias. 3 Our main objective is to investigate whether real wages comove substantially over the business cycle, and to disentangle the cyclical properties of wages for skilled (college) and unskilled (no college) workers. To do so, we employ a dynamic latent factor model in which real wages respond to common as well as skill-specific factors.
Our dynamic factor model is motivated by the fact that if real wages exhibit a systematic relationship with the business cycle, then there should be a common factor accounting for a considerable amount of their variability. Furthermore, from a macroeconomic perspective, wage cyclicality would imply that the common factor drives the majority of real wages in the same direction. We provide evidence that real wages do not comove substantially and do not exhibit strong comovement related to the aggregate business cycle. The common factor present in wage data that we estimate does in fact turn out to be correlated with the national unemployment rate. However, we show that no more than 9% of wage variability is attributed to the common factor. We also show that real wages do not exhibit a distinct pattern as regards to their response to the common factor. Finally, we confirm findings of previous studies in which the wages of skilled and unskilled workers exhibit roughly the same degree of cyclical variation.
The cyclical behavior of real wages enables us to draw inferences about different theories of the labor market as described analytically in Appendix A. In macro models, business cycles are driven by aggregate shocks and endogenous variables can be expressed as functions of the state of the world so that their solution is expressed in the form of an approximate dynamic factor model. A set of competing theories (models) impose a structure on the relationship between real wages and the business cycle which depends on the evolution of state variables. For instance, in Walrasian models real wages coincide with marginal productivity. Since marginal productivity (usually driven by an aggregate shock) is highly correlated with the business cycle, real wages appear to be strongly procyclical. On the other hand, a labor contracting model implies that real wages depend not only on marginal productivity, but also on an insurance component that results from bargaining between worker and firm. These two components offset each other in such a way that real wages become acyclical. 4 Moreover, in models of this class, equilibrium real wages also depend on market conditions the time labor contracts are signed. In this case, real wages depend not only on the current state of the economy but also on previous states of the economy. In the appendix of the paper, we briefly describe the relevant feature of neoclassical and labor contracting models which determines how wages behave and demonstrate that the models have different implications for both the relationship between individual wages and the common factor, as well as the quantitative importance of the factor itself. The dynamic factor analysis in this paper can then be a direct test of the neoclassical model or, more generally, any model which imposes structure on the relationship between real wages and the business cycle. 5 It has two advantages over a direct estimation of structural models. First, we can consider a large panel of workers of different types to see if the neoclassical implications hold for 'most' indviduals, or for at least a subset of workers. Second, our test of the model will not lead to a rejection simply because some other feature of the structural model (such as the consumption Euler equation) rejects the RBC model.
Our findings suggest that real wages behave in a manner more consistent with models of labor contracting, though other models may be as well. This is in the line of the findings presented by Cooley and Ogaki (1996) who show that the time series properties of real wages are compatible with Walrasian models only in the long-run, whereas in the short-run they are better explained by an optimal labor contract model. 6 Finally, our evidence confirms the findings of Keane and Prasad (1993) in that the behavior of real wages of skilled and unskilled workers do not exhibit substantial differences over the business cycle. We reach this conclusion from the fact that the skill-specific factors we estimate are not quantitatively important.
Our results are distinct from the existing literature in the use of the individual level data coupled with the dynamic factor model. At the same time our work is part of a long history of studying the cyclical behavior of wages and it is useful to briefly review the main contributions. Given that the literature is too large and varied, our review will not be exhaustive. Several studies estimate econometric models using disaggregated data to control for composition and aggregation effects. In most of those studies, real wages are regressed on the current unemployment rate, as an indicator of the business cycle, and other worker-specific characteristics. Among others, these studies, include the work of Bils (1985) , Keane, Moffitt, and Runkle (1988) , Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) , Shin (1994) , Ziliak, Wilson, and Stone (1999) , Shin and Solon (2006), and Verdugo (2016) . Bils, Solon et al., Shin, Ziliak et al., Shin and Solon, and Verdugo, find that real wage acyclicality is simply a statistical illusion and that real wages are strongly procyclical. Using US data, Solon et al. find that the composition bias issue is quantitatively important. A similar result is reported by Verdugo who finds that real wages in the Eurozone are highly procyclical, while composition effects have been particularly large since 2008. Bils however, demonstrates that the impact of composition bias is not notably large and argues that wage procyclicality is due to the inclusion of overtime earnings. 7 Keane et al report that real wages are only mildly procyclical after controling for sample selection bias. 8 Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) on the other hand, demonstrate that when appropriate lagged values of the cyclical indicator are included in the regression then the estimated procyclicality of real wages dissapears.
Previous studies have found that the real wages of skilled workers exhibit different low frequency variation than that of the real wages of unskilled workers. Katz and Murphy (1992) , find that this behavior can be explained by different demand shifts for skilled and unskilled labor. Motivated by those findings, Acemoglu (1998) , develops a theoretical framework to show that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers as well as the changes in the demand for skills are due to skilled-biased technological change which is determined endogenously. Krusell et al. (2000) , report empirical evidence showing that wage differentials are due to the existence of capital-skill complementarity which is present in the production process. These theoretical and empirical arguments have direct implications in building alternative theories of the labor market. These theories must also be consistent with the cyclical behavior of wage differentials and thus, knowledge of cyclical facts of skilled versus unskilled wages is essential. Within the context of our framework, if the cyclical properties of real wages for skilled and unskilled workers are not alike, then there should exist different skill-specific factors explaining a considerable portion of wage variability. We find that there is little evidence of significantly distinct cycles for these two groups of workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of our dataset which is extracted from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). Section 3, introduces the model and Section 4 lays out our econometric framework and methodology. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes.
The data
Our data on hourly wages are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLSY79 Cohort), which is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women born in the years 1957 through 1964. All respondents were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994. We use the time series from 1979 to 1993 and collect information from the survey on employment, wages and sociodemographic characteristics. 9 The advantage of the NLS panel data set is that it avoids problems related to having a changing work force and enables us to control for various worker characteristics. Unlike the Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where the hourly wage in a given year is the ratio of the annual income to the annual hours of work, in the NLS the respondents directly report their hourly rate of pay in the week of the interview. Thus, the advantage of using NLS over PSID is that hourly wages are less contaminated by recall bias. 10, 11 We accept only those respondents that meet the following restrictions: 1) Must be at least 18 years old at the interview date; 2) Are not self-employed; 3) There must be at least 7 years of available time series observations; 4) Are not enrolled in school the last 2 years of the sample period.
After removing the respondents who do not meet our criteria our sample contains 2,123 individuals and 31,845 person-year observations. We provide further analysis of our sample by classifying individuals into 8 broadly defined categories on the basis of skills, gender and race. We define skilled workers as those having at least a college degree and unskilled workers as the remainder of the sample. Race is defined based on the information provided by NLS, which classifies the respondents into three race groups, Hispanic, Black and non-Black/non-Hispanic. We group the sample into two main categories. One category consists of Blacks and Hispanic and the other one consists of the remainder of the sample, which is assumed to be largely nonminority. A detailed description of the composition of our sample can be found in Table 1 . The wage measure is deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to provide a real wage measure normalized in terms of 1983 CPI dollars. The data are log-first-differenced and demeaned before estimation. 12 One potential issue that we face is that our dataset is an unbalanced panel as missing observations constitute 27.7% of the sample. Missing observations arise in the NLS because either the respondent is not interviewed or he/she is enrolled at school or he/she is unemployed. Wage observations where respondents are enrolled at school but at the same time report a positive wage rate are treated as missing observations. (Information about missing observations for each category can be found in Table 1 .) One approach to solving this problem is to simply drop the time series containing missing observations. Since this signifcantly reduces the sample size, and may induce a selection bias, we take an alternative approach. We treat the missing oberservations as random variables and estimate them as part of our econometric model. Our methodology for estimating the missing observations is described in Section 4 and Appendix B.
The dynamic factor model
To estimate the cyclical properties of real wages we use a dynamic factor model in the spirit of Sargent and Sims (1977) as implemented by Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) . This statistical model differs from the models traditionally employed to estimate wage cyclicality. In previous work, wages are associated with cyclical indicators (eg. the unemployment rate). Of course, if one chooses the 'wrong' cyclical indicator the results will be biased towards finding acyclical wages. The factor model, by definition, extracts the largest common cycle(s) in the wage data. Hence, we are finding the maximum possible amount of cyclicality in the wage data. Our model then gives the best possible chance to the theories in favor of cyclical wages.
To be concrete, let y t be a vector of real wages for N individuals at time t. Then, y t can be explained by a vector f t of K common factors and a vector ε t of N individual-specific noise terms. We assume that f t and ε t evolve according to the following autoregressions:
and
where ϕ f (L) and ( ) are diagonal K × Q and N × P matrices of polynomials in the lag operator, respectively.
The vectors of disturbances u and u t are assumed to be zero mean and normally distributed with
where M f and M are diagonal matrices and (u u ) = 0. In other words, the factors are independent from each other and the individual-specific noise terms are independent across individuals. The statistical model for y t is
where b is a N × K matrix of factor loadings. We focus our attention in characterizing the dynamic effects of three factors. The common dynamics of real wages across all individuals are captured by the common factor f c . The factors f s (where s = skilled or unskilled) drive the wages of a subset of individuals with the same skill level. Thus, having panel data on N individuals, each observed for T time periods, our model for the real wage of individual i is , = , + , + , for = 1, 2, .., ; = skilled or unskilled; = 1, ..,
where b j,i is the 'factor loading' that captures the sensitivity of the wage of worker i to factor j. Note that for a skilled worker the factor loading on the unskilled factor is constrained to zero, and vice versa for the unskilled worker. The corresponding idiosyncratic error ε i,t follows a p i -order autoregression:
where ϕ i,j represents the exposure of the idiosyncratic error to its jth lag and , ∼ iid (0, 2 ). Likewise, the law of motion of factor j is given by the AR(q i ) process:
where ϕ fk,j represents the exposure of factor k to its jth lag and , ∼ iid (0, 2 , ).
Estimation
We estimate the factors and the parameters of the econometric model 3.4-3.6 using the Bayesian approach developed in Otrok and Whiteman (1998) . We simulate from the joint posterior of the parameters and factors using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo alogorithm. The main part of their procedure is a Gibbs sampler that sequentially draws the parameters conditional on the factors, and then the factors conditional on the parameters. 13 Since the innovations to idiosyncratic terms are uncorrelated, conditional on the factors, the system 4.4 consists of N independent regression models. Hence, conditional on the factors, we use Chib and Greenberg (1994) procedure to draw the regression parameters separately for each equation. Since the model has 2,123 equations this feature of their procedure makes the estimation feasible for our dataset. A full derivation and description of the relevant conditional densities can be found in Otrok and Whiteman (1998) .
The (conjugate) prior densities for b i , ϕ i , ϕ fk and 2 are chosen to be the same as those used in Otrok and Whiteman (1998) . Specifically, the prior for the factor loadings b i is Gausian with zero mean and precision (1/variance) equal to 0.01. The persistence parameters of the innovation and factor processes ϕ i and ϕ fk are also Gaussian with zero mean and precision equal to 0.85 for all lags. The prior of the idiosyncratic innovation variance 2 is an inverted gamma ∼ ( /2, /2) with α = 6 and β = 0.001. These priors are fairly diffuse and the main results are not very sensitive to values of prior parameters around the ones chosen.
Our dataset poses a technical problem due to missing observations for wages in some years for many of the survey respondents. Instead of ommiting the time series we assume that the missing observations are random variables and we estimate these missing observations as part of our econometric model. We do so by first deriving the distribution of the missing data points conditional on the parameters and factors. This distribution depends on both cross-sectional information as well as the time series data before and after the missing observation. Intuitively, the distribution depends on both a 'forecast' and 'backcast' of the missing observation using the univariate time series data itself, and the parameters governing the dynamics of the time series. It also includes cross-sectional information: the factor loading is used along with the factor itself to 'predict' the missing value. Our procedure combines both types of information. A direct way to do this is by applying the Kalman filter and then smoothing the means and the variances by backward induction. Details of the procedure are in Appendix B.
14 Our Gibbs sampler then has three blocks. In block one we condition on factors and model parameters to draw the missing observations (for those time series with missing data). Then, in block two we treat the missing data drawn in block one as data and draw the model parameters. Finally, conditional on the drawn missing data and parameters we draw the factors. The procedure is repeated 5000 times after an initial burnin of 500 draws.
Empirical results
Our primary interest is to provide answers to two questions: First, do real wages exhibit a systematic relationship with the business cycle? Second, are the wages of skilled and unskilled workers subject to a significantly different degree of cyclical variation? To answer the first question we focus on the importance of the common factor in equation 4. To answer the second question we focus on the relative contribution of the skill factors in equation 4 in accounting for real wage fluctuations. Since the factors (common and skill specific) are estimated simultaneously, the skill factors are capturing how much comovement there is for a specific skill group conditional on comovement already accounted for by the factor common to all wages. That is, skilled (or unskilled) wages may comove simply because all wages comove. Our model determines instead how much comovement there is in skilled wages that is not common to wages of all skill levels. This conditioning is important, as it alleviates the danger of looking only at, say, the wages of skilled workers, and mistakenly concluding that skilled wages have a common cycle, when that cycle is in fact common to a wider array of individuals. The variable used by the previous studies as an indicator of the business cycle is the national unemployment rate. In fact, our common (wage) factor exhibits a strong negative correlation (−0.69) with the national unemployment rate (in levels) which indicates that the unemployment indicator captures a good portion of real wage cyclicality. However, the correlation is not perfect so assuming that unemployment is the common wage cycle underestimates the degree of wage cyclicality to a modest extent. It is the case that our estimates suggest that macroeconomic conditions are relevant, at least to some extent, for the cyclical behavior of real wages.
The dynamic factors
We interpret the factor as being related to the macroeconomic business cycle. In Figure 2 we plot the wage factor along with TFP, and also the wage factor with a macro factor, The macro factor is estimated using unemployment, TFP, real GDP growth, growth of the price of real investment, and the growth of labor productivity. As is evident from the figure, there is a correspondence of the wage factor with the macro factor. At the same time, the wage factor does not move very closely with TFP. The wage factor then is related to a broad cross section of macroeconomic variables. While TFP does have a relationship with the wage factor, it is clearly not very strong. This is precisely why we do not want to study the cyclicality of wages using either TFP or a single macroeconomic variable. The skill-specific factors appear less cyclical than the aggregate factor and have distinct dynamics from each other. The correlation coefficient between the skilled and the unskilled factors is 0.26 which signifies that real wages embody a distinct component which is specific to skills. 17 The correlation coefficient between the skill factors and the unemployment rate is almost zero. Both factors exhibit substantial variation until 1985 and relatively smooth fluctuations afterwards. 18 To examine whether common fluctuations are more persistent than skill specific fluctuations we report the first-order autocorrelation coefficients of the factors. Our estimates indicate that aggregate common fluctuations are highly persistent just like the unemployment rate. The common fluctuations of unskilled wages are also highly persistent with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.68. Contrary to the common and the unskilled factors, the skilled factor exhibits a negative autocorrelation of −0.21 which suggests that it is weakly mean reverting. The differing dynamics of the skilled factor suggests that there are forces unique to skilled workers driving their wages. If we interpret this in light of the theoretical models presented in the appendix, then this would suggest skill-specific productivity shocks. We do not push this interpretation very hard though, since we will see that these factors are not quantitatively important. Next we examine the direction to which a change in each of the factors affects real wages. Figure 3 displays the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the factor loadings. The CDFs illustrate that roughly half of real wages in our sample respond positively to the factors while the other half respond negatively. Thus, there is no distinct pattern of the responses of real wages to the common factors. Macroeconomic models of the labor market can be classified based on the mechanism according to which real wages are being determined and the implied cyclicality of the latter. Surveying all relevant models is not the objective of this paper. However, in the appendix we show that the factor model can be employed as a test of one model of the labor market -the Walrasian spot market model of wages. Testing via the factor model enable us to consider a large panel of longitudinal micro data on real wages to check whether the neoclassical implications hold for "most" individuals or a subset of them. The factor model also eliminates the possibility of rejecting the theory simply because some irrelevant feature of the theoretical model is problematic. As shown in the appendix, a neoclassical model of the labor market where marginal productivities depend on aggregate shocks (commonly, an aggregate technology shock) would imply that all wages respond with the same sign to the common factor. For instance, an improvement in technology would increase the wages of all workers. Therefore, in such model, we expect that real wages would exhibit a positive and strong correlation with the business cycle. Our results are strongly at odds with the spot market/Walrasian assumption at the heart of RBC models.
On the other hand, a wage contracting model with some heterogeneity in preferences (e.g., in risk aversion) may exhibit responses with different signs for a single change in market conditions (which may reflect improvement or deterioration of the level of technology). The latter is consistent with factor loading coefficients that differ in sign and magnitude. Our results indicate that the common factor exhibits responses with different signs which suggests that the data are inconsistent with the predictions of a Walrasian model but consistent with predictions of a labor contracting model. There may of course be many models consistent with these results, our main point is that the RBC model is not, and we can identify at least one reasonable alternative.
Variance decompositions
To examine the quantitative significance of the cyclical factors we estimate the contribution of each of them to the overall variability of observables. Since the factors and the idiosyncratic component are orthogonal to each other it is straightforward to partition the variance of each observable into the fraction that is due to each of the underlying factors and the idiosyncratic component by applying the Var operator to equation 3.4. Reporting the full posterior distributions of all 2,123 posteriors is infeasible, so instead we report information on the distribution of the posterior means of the 2,123 variance decompositions. In most cases that we examined the posterior coverage intervals were tighly distributed about the mean. Figure 4 displays frequencies of variance decompositions across the skilled, the unskilled and the whole sample while Figure 5 displays CDFs of the corresponding variance decompositions. Table 2 presents analytically the number of individuals falling in each interval of variance shares attributable to each of the factors and the idiosyncratic component. The common factor explains, on average, no more than 9% of the variance of real wages. We obtain similar results when we examine the impact of the factor separately on skilled and unskilled wages. Overall, the common factor accounts for 20% or less of the wage variability for 88% of the workers in the sample. The share of variance attributable to the common factor exceeds 50% for only 1% of the workers. In other words, the wages of only 1% of the respondents are overwhelmingly influenced by current economic conditions, as reflected through the common factor. These results show that the factor plays a relatively minor role in accounting for wage movements over the business cycle. Consequently, the explanatory power of the common factor is inadequate to justify claims for strong procyclical or countercyclical movements of real wages. Likewise, the skill factor explains, on average, no more than 10% of wage variability and accounts for 20% or less of wage variability for 84% of the workers in the sample. Those findings reinforce the evidence of previous studies which show that skilled and unskilled wages face essentially the same degree of cyclical variation.
These results are also inconsistent with a fixed nominal wage contract model. If we augment the neoclassical model in Appendix A.1. with a model where nominal wages are set for a fixed number of periods, then we would find that at least half, or a quarter of the wages, depending on the nominal wage contract length, would depend almost completely on the common factor. For example, if we have nominal wages fixed for 1 period, and half of workers get to change wages in a given period, then our common factor would find that more than half of the workers respond to the common factor. 19 Notably, the idiosyncratic component is an important factor of wage fluctuations. It can explain more than 70% of wage variability for 78% of the workers. It is possible that this residual may include the effects of characteristics such as gender and race. To examine the robustness of our main results we extend our model by including gender and race factors. Specifically, we assume that there is a specific factor driving the wages of male workers and a separate factor driving the wages of female workers. As for the race characteristics we follow the NLS classification and assume two broadly defined race factors, one driving the wages of blacks and hispanics and another driving the wages of the remainder. We call the latter group nonminority and the former group minority. For instance, in this setting, the real wage of a skilled female worker who belongs to a minority group is driven by five factors, one that drives the wages of all workers, one that drives the wages of all skilled workers, one that drives the wages of all female workers, one that drives the wages of all minority workers and finally a factor that is specific to the worker. We find that the gender and the race factors have little to no explanatory power and do not change our main results. Thus, they are not retained in the final statistical model.
Concluding remarks
The cyclical behavior of real wages has long been a central issue in macroeconomics. Our contribution to this literature is to use a dynamic factor model with longitudinal data to find the largest possible common cycle in real wages. The advantage of this approach over previous approaches is that it does not impose structure on the relationship between real wages and observed indicators of the business cycle prior to estimation. Our approach also allows us to use longitudinal micro data from the NLS to control for composition and aggregation effects.
Our model allows us to analyze the degree and the nature of the comovement of real wages across the entire population as well as separately for skilled and unskilled workers. It also enables us to quantify the contribution of each factor in wage variability.
We find that the common factor exhibits a significant but not perfect correlation with the national unemployment rate which is the common component of real wages assumed by previous studies. This indicates that macroeconomic conditions have indeed an impact on real wages. Nevertheless, variance decompositions show that, on average, the common factor accounts for only a small fraction of wage fluctuations. Furthermore, roughly half the wages are procyclical and half are countercyclical. These results are not consistent with neoclassical models of labor markets. Our findings also suggest that although skilled and unskilled wages are driven by different common skill factors, these factors cannot explain a significant portion of wage variability.
A The factor model and two theoretical models

A.1 A neoclassical model
The dynamic factor model of Section 4 can be motivated by a standard real business cycle model augmented with a model of measurement error induced by the agency gathering data. This motivation follows directly from the work of Sargent (1989) . We start with a 'textbook' real business cycle model, that of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) , which specifies preferences, technology and budget constraints. Using standard parametric functional forms for preferences and technology the model can be log-linearized and solved. 20 As is well known the solution of this model takes the form of a state law of motion and set of decision rules for observable variables:
The first system of equations describes the dynamic evolution of the vector of state variables and exogenous shocks, such as capital and technology. The second system of equations are the decision rules, linking the vector of endogenous choices, Y t , to the current state vector, S t . Typical decision variables are labor effort and consumption. Of course, the real wage would appear in Y t as well.
As is well known, the real wage of the representative agent in this model is highly procyclical as the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. To clarify this implication we follow the conventional way to decentralize the Pareto optimal equilibria of the model by assuming spot-competitive labor markets. Let the utility of agent i, U i , be defined over consumption, C it , and work effort, H it such that > 0, < 0, < 0 and < 0, where subscripts denote derivatives. Let θ t be an exogenous state variable which is the driving force of business cycle fluctuations. Without loss of generality, since in RBC models, θ t commonly denotes the level of neutral technology, we will simply call θ t technology. 21 Let ψ i (θ t ) denote the agent's marginal productivity which is an increasing function of technology θ t . The intratemporal efficiency condition derived from an RBC model is
This condition results from the agent equating his marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the real wage, while firms choose labor such that the marginal product of labor equals the real wage. The spot-market equilibrium then implies that real wages equal marginal productivities. Consequently, under spot-competitive labor markets we expect that over the business cycle there is a common (macro) component, θ, driving the real wages of all agents, and that these wages move in the same direction.
Our extension of this model assumes that we do not get to observe the 'true' real wage. Instead, we have many noisy observations on individual wages from this competitive spot labor market. The noise is induced by a data-gathering agency which must survey individuals to find out their wages. These survey data are riddled with errors, both recall errors from the agents and statistical errors from the agency itself. Our second system of equations then becomes:
where U U represents the measurement error and the Y t vector contains the full set of indivudals surveyed. The empirical model we will use in this paper, a dynamic factor model, is motivated directly from equations 7 and 10. These equations take the same general form as a dynamic factor model. To make this link concrete consider the dynamic factor representation for a vector of wage data y t :
where b is a N × K matrix of factor loadings. The factor f t is assumed to follow an autoregressive process:
It is clear from comparing equations 7 and 10 with equations 11 and 12 that the dynamic factor model takes the same form as the linearized solution to the real business cycle model with measurement error. Were one to simulate data from the RBC model and estimate a factor model on the simulated data, the estimated dynamic factor would then be the common state variable (e.g., technology shock) in the business cycle model. When we turn to actual data, if the neoclassical labor market embodying this model is largely correct, then when we estimate the factor model on wage data we should have two key results. First, as long as the wage data are not dominated by measurement errors, the common factor should be quantitatively important for explaining real wage dynamics. Second, the wages should all respond with the same sign to this common factor since in the business cycle model all wages respond positively to changes in productivity.
A.2 A wage contracting model
Our second labor market model is based on an alternative way to decentralize the Pareto optimal equilibria by considering a model where agents trade labor contracts. In such a model, wages and employment are specified in a contract which is the outcome of dynamic bargaining between workers and firms. The contract, {w i (θ t ), H i (θ t )}, consists of an hourly wage rate and hours of work that are contingent on the future state of technology.
The contract is such that the efficiency condition 9 holds, but the hourly wage rate is not necessarily equal to ψ i (θ t ). The hourly wage not only responds to changes in productivity but also provides insurance to risk averse agents against business cycle fluctuations. 22 Contrary to the spot market case, under reasonable assumptions, in equilibrium the wage will not be strongly correlated with productivity. This is due to the fact that the wage embodies an insurance component which minimizes their fluctuations. Furthermore, a given change in θ may induce the wages of some agents to increase while others to decrease. Hence, responses of different signs to a given change in the common component are consistent with the theory of implicit contracts. To illustrate these two points, we provide a simple example where consumption equals labor earnings that is, = , and the agents differ in terms of their aversion toward risk. Assuming separable CRRA preferences, condition 9 can be solved for the equilibrium wage (see Boldrin and Horvath (1995) ): 23
where δ i > 0 and λ i is the agent's coefficient of risk aversion. (Note that the linearized version of equation 13 would enter the decision rules 8 or 10 in the state space system describing the model dynamics.) In this case, the equilibrium wage is comprised of two components, productivity and insurance (which is the ratio of leisure to labor). Productivity is strongly procyclical whereas the insurance component is countercyclical because hours of work are procyclical. The latter offsets the increases (decreases) in productivity and thus, wages do not appear to respond strongly to technology shocks. Notice that parameter λ i controls the elasticity of the hourly wage to the marginal product of labor fluctuations. Depending on the value of λ i , for some individuals the effect of the insurance component may dominate the effect of productivity and thereby, the change in their wage, in response to an increase in θ, will have a negative sign. The more risk averse an agent is the more likely she/he is to have a negative wage response to an increase in θ. To summarize, the contracting model first implies that real wages will not exhibit a strong commmon cycle, implying that any common dynamic factor should have little explanatory power for real wage fluctuations. Second, if there is heterogeneity in preferences then the model predicts that the factor loading coefficients in the dynamic factor model will have both positive and negative signs. 24
B Factor models with unbalanced panels
In this appendix we describe the procedure for estimating the missing observations. This procedure forms one block of our Gibbs sampler. In block one we draw the parameters conditional on factors and missing data. In block two we draw the factors conditional on parameters and missing data. In block three we draw the missing data conditional on parameters and factors. In essence, we fill in the missing observations of the unbalanced panel using information in both the model and available data. It is this last block that we describe in this appendix. The first two blocks are described in Otrok and Whiteman (1998) .
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